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INTRODUCTION

Texas judges are paying more and more attention to the development of state constitutional law. This is so whether the phenomenon
is viewed as a return to the Lone Star State's earlier legal traditions or
as a manifestation of the "New Federalism." As federal courts increasingly retreat from protecting individual rights and liberties,' the
Texas judiciary has joined others throughout the nation in developing
state constitutional jurisprudence.
As a result, Texas judges and lawyers often face the daunting task
of crafting a cogent and intellectually sound bill of rights analysis for
the case at hand, especially when it involves understanding and implementing provisions drafted more than a century and a half ago. 2 How
do they, for example, discern and apply the Texas Bill of Rights to
questions of privacy, polygraphs, drug testing, wiretappirg, computer
interfacing and match-ups, equal treatment for women and minorities, education, compulsory medical and psychiatric treatment, retaliatory employment termination, rights of the poor and homeless,
prison and jail reform, and the other concerns of modern Texas?3 InI. See generally

JAMES

C.

HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS:

TARY AND LITIGATION MANUAL

A

COMMEN-

1-15 (Chapter 1, "Emergence of State Bill of Rights

Protections").
2. Id. at 17-33 (Chapter 2, "The Texas Bill of Rights").

3. A good number of law review articles in recent years have undertaken tc explore state
constitutional developments in these areas. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers
under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1340, 1356 (1990) (examining general
separation powers jurisprudence in Texas and limited availability of judicial review of administrative action in Texas); Linda G. Hemphill, Challenging Conditions of Confinement: A State
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deed, twice now,4 the Court of Criminal Appeals pointedly has called
upon intermediate appellate courts and attorneys to analyze more
carefully state constitutional arguments that eventually reach the
highest level for decision. 5
To that end, this article briefly outlines the historical origins of the
Texas Bill of Rights and then considers various methods of constitutional inquiry employed by courts in Texas and other states.6 The
article examines modes of state constitutional differentiation, a process that may influence the ultimate result of the case and may reveal
the philosophy of the court. Also, the article explains the various
rules of construction and then discusses different approaches to analyzing the Texas Bill of Rights, from linguistic variations to historical
sources. The final segment suggests a structure that might be helpful
in presenting state constitutional arguments.

II.
A.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS

Earlier Constitutions

Texans have lived under a total of nine constitutions, with three in
effect during the period when Texas formed part of Mexico's northern
reaches: the 1812 Spanish Constitution; the 1824 Mexican Republic
Constitution; and the 1827 Constitution of the State of Coahuila y

Constitutional Approach, 20 WILLAMETTE L.J. 409, 409-11 (1984) (summarizing history of
federal and state court decisions pertaining to treatment of prisoners); Michael L. Perlin, State
Constitutionsand Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?,
20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (1987) (discussing period from 1972 to 1978 as "golden age"
of federal litigation regarding mentally disabled).
4. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc)
(remanding case to court of appeals to consider appellant's state constitutional claim); McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 501 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (remanding to
court of appeals question of whether defendant had right to counsel before deciding whether to
provide breath sample for intoxilyzer test).
5. Indeed, not properly raising a state constitutional claim may expose a lawyer to a
charge of malpractice. State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring);
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985).
6. Although Philip Bobbitt's ConstitutionalFate and Michael Kent Curtis's No State
Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights address the United States
Constitution, they are useful models for the kind of exegesis described in this article. See generally PHILIP C. BOBBIr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (analyzing federal constitution);
MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND

THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (reviewing United States Constitution).
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Texas.' Of the six organic charters ratified after Texas gained independence from Mexico, the first five-including the Republic's constitution-manifested classic liberal philosophy establishing a
benevolent central government. Except for variations in the bill of
rights, the constitutions were fairly similar to the United States Constitution and were characteristic of state constitutions of that era.
The current Texas Constitution, however, reflects a marked shift in
political theory.
Although Sam Houston was not a political philosopher, he served
as the leader for the fifty-nine beleaguered delegates who gathered for
the 1836 convention at Washington-on-the-Brazos to draft the constitution for the new Republic. Some of the delegates there had helped
write constitutions for other states. One of the more prominent delegates was Lorenzo de Zavala, widely respected for his intellectual argument in favor of republican government. The 1836 rights charter
was an amalgam of Jacksonian democracy, British common law,
Spanish civil law, the ideals in the Magna Charta, the English Bill of
Rights, William Penn's Frame of Government, the Charter of Privileges for Pennsylvania, the Declaration of Independence, and George
Mason's Virginia Bill of Rights. 9
The Jacksonian democrats, who formed a majority in the 1836 convention, generally favored greater constitutional guarantees than
those provided by the United States Bill of Rights. Jacksonian ideals
took a strong, early hold in Texas because, as a new territory, it comprised people who did not have the history of earlier political traditions that had developed along the eastern seashore. Also, Sam
Houston and Andrew Jackson, both strong and inspiring leaders,
were close personal friends and fellow Tennesseans who shared similar political views. 1"
The Declaration of Rights in the constitution this delegation
7. TEX. CONST. pmbl., interp. commentary (Vernon 1984); 2 CLARENCE WHARTON,
230-31 (1930).
8. J.E. Ericson, Origins of the Texas Bill of Rights, 62 Sw. HIST. Q. 457, 466 (1959).
9. Gerald Ashford, JacksonianLiberalism and Spanish Law in Early Texas, 57 Sw. HIST.
Q. 1, 10, 30-33 (1953); J.E. Ericson, Origins of the Texas Bill of Rights, 62 Sw. HIST. Q. 45759, 461, 466 (1959); Joseph W. McKnight, Stephen Austin's Legalistic Concerns, 89 Sw. HIST.
TEXAS UNDER MANY FLAGS

Q. 240, 265 (1986); Arvel (Rod) Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of Rights, 20
ST. MARY'S L.J. 93, 96-97 (1988); Rupert N. Richardson, Framing the Constitution of the

Republic of Texas, 31 Sw. HIST. Q. 191, 209-14 (1928).
10. Arvel (Rod) Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST.
L.J. 93, 97 (1988).
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drafted included seventeen sections and an introductory paragraph
forbidding violations "on any pretense whatever."'" This document
provided the model for the bill of rights written in 1845 when Texas
applied for statehood; and it set the pattern for its successors in 1861
(Secession), 1866 (post-Civil War), 1869 (Reconstruction), and 1876.
After careful discussion and revision, during final debate by the entire convention, the drafters crafted the 1845 constitution to expand
the scope of the bill of rights beyond the 1836 prototype.1 2 The 1866
post-Civil War constitution was fashioned like the 1845 predecessor,
but abolished slavery and essentially restated the 1845 bill of rights.' 3
The 1869 Reconstruction constitution reflected the dominant Republican tenets of the time, provided for a centralized state government,
gave extensive appointment powers to the governor, introduced a
state-financed public school system, and preserved intact the 1845 bill
14
of rights.
B.

The 1876 Constitution

The current constitution of Texas was authored by ninety delegates
elected to the 1875 constitutional convention which was convened almost in rebellion against Governor Richard Coke. Governor Coke
had resisted calling an election to select delegates for the convention
because he had his own version of a constitution, a document he
strongly supported but was unable to pass. Most of the delegates in
1875 were farmers and lawyers but the group also included
merchants, editors, and physicians, as well as some legislators and
judges. Five or six delegates were African-American, seventy-five
11. Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Declaration of Rights (1836), reprinted in
TEX. CONST. app. 535 (Vernon 1955).
12. DEBATES OF THE TEXAS CONVENTION 302-13 (W.F. Weeks ed., 1846) (available

from Texas State Archives); see

JOURNALS OF THE CONVENTION

33-35, 131-35 (Miner &

Cruger eds., 1845) (detailing drafting bill of rights and discussing proposed revisions); J.E.
Ericson, Origin of the Texas Bill of Rights, 62 Sw. HIST. Q. 457, 461-64, 466 (1959) (adding
restrictions against religious tests for public offices, ex post facto laws, interfering with right to
contract, and limiting power of eminent domain). Although opposing United States annexation of Texas, Senator Daniel Webster praised its constitution as one of the best of existing
state constitutions. TEX. CONST. pmbl., interp. commentary (Vernon 1984).
13. Compare TEX. CONST. of 1866, arts. I & VIII (providing bill of rights similar to that
of Texas Constitution of 1845 and also providing for protection of rights of freedom) with TEX.
CONST. of 1845, arts. I & VIII (listing enumerated rights and describing legislature's ability to
pass laws regarding slavery).
14. See Matthew R. Paul & Jeffrey L. Van Horn, Heitman v. State: The Question Left
Unanswered, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929, 952-53 (1992) (describing aspects of 1869 constitution).
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were Democrats, and fifteen were Republicans.15 Thirty-seven belonged to a coalition of farmers, known as the Grange, who fought
monopolistic grain transport practices.' 6 Contrary to some popular
historical views, the 1875 convention reflected less a reaction to Reconstruction and more a movement away from empowered government exemplified by the federal constitution.17 The convention
manifested a desire for a more restrictive, "hands off," even anti-gov8
ernment, approach.'
The Grangers wanted a constitution that would curtail government
power and prevent economic domination by large monopolies and expansive business interests.19 Often Republicans voted with the
Grangers to prevent Democrats from further ensconcing themselves
in the structure of state government. This marriage of convenience
frequently resulted in enhanced protection of individual rights and
pronounced limitations on state authority.
To the 1875 delegates, there was a significant political difference
between the structure of the federal and state constitutions. The delegates saw the United States Constitution as protecting the privileged
and moneyed minorities from the democratic majority and the Texas
Constitution as shielding the democratic majority from the economically advantaged minorities.20
15. SETH S. McKAY, MAKING THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION OF 1876 74-75 (1924). See
generally T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS (1983)
(describing history of Texas); JOE BERTRAM FRANTZ, TEXAS: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY
124 (1976) (outlining Texas history); A. J. Thomas, Jr. & Ann Van Wynen Thomas, The Texas
Constitution of 1876, 35 TEX. L. REV. 907, 907 (1957) (describing make-up of delegates).
16. Other farmers were also chosen as delegates, giving Grange interests approximately
45 votes. Approximately half the lawyers voted with the Grange. John Walker Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case Study of Texas 204, 211-12 (198 1) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, on file with St. Mary's Law Journal)(comprehensively analyzing historical
and political forces behind 1876 constitution).
17. Id. at 1-18, 123-26, 185, 203, 205, 210-59. See generally 3 WILLIAM WINSLOW
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION AND HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1980)
(asserting that overall theme of United States Constitution was to confer broad power on government, especially legislative branch, in best interests of people).
18. Cf. Samuel D. Myres, Mysticism, Realism and the Texas Constitution of 1876, 9 Sw.
Soc. SCI. Q, 166, 182-83 (1928) (concluding that constitution of 1876 imposed serious limitations upon power of government which rendered it practically government of negation).
19. Mikal Watts & Brad Rockwell, The Original Intent of the Education Article of the
Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771, 785-91 (1990).
20. See John Walker Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case Study of
Texas 270-71 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with St. Mary's Law Journal)
(discussing restrictive document produced at constitutional convention of 1875 which rejected
liberal constitutional values).
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The one provision of the constitution which departed from the
"systematically restrictive approach" of the new organic charter was
the hotly debated judiciary article in which the delegates ultimately

deferred to the comprehensive role of the courts "charged with high
and holy duties."21 The delegates had more faith that the courts,
rather than other state authorities, would protect individual liberties.
The delegates sought to ensure judicial accountability and prevent
misuse of power through direct election of judges and, at the district

court level, use of single-member districts. This action accentuated
the already sharp contest over the suffrage provisions of the new constitution. Besides trying to limit the influence of the African-American vote through appointing rather than electing judges,2 2 the
Democratic establishment under Governor Coke suggested a variety
of electoral impediments: a poll tax, literacy tests, registration, and
property taxes, as well as multi-member congressional and judicial
districts.2 3
The delegates consistently rejected these schemes to limit suffrage,

although not because of any generous impulses of equality. Rather,
the Grangers understood that these Democratic devices for denying
the franchise to African-Americans would inevitably deprive the
Grangers of the political power they needed to break the state govern-

ment's support of big business, railroads, and monopolies.2 4 Ultimately, the unlikely but pragmatic convention alliances resulted in
Texas having some of the broadest suffrage rights in the nation 25 and

an organic law of reform that limited government. 26 The 1876 consti21. Id. at 246-48.

22. Id. at 236.
23. Id. at 191-92, 236, 242-43.
24. See John Walker Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case Study of
Texas 16-17, 191, 201, 225-26, 237-40 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with St.
Mary's Law Journal) (citing DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1875 149 (Seth S. McKay ed., 1920)).
25. Id. at 191-92. The suffrage provisions allowed non-citizen males to vote if they met
the residency requirement and declared their intent to become citizens. TEX.CONST. art. VI,
§ 2, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955). Even after the poll tax was added in 1902, non-citizens could vote until 1919. John Walker Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's:
A Case Study of Texas 191-92 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with St. Mary's
Law Journal). Female suffrage was strongly debated in the 1868 and 1875 conventions and
finally realized for primary elections in 1918. Id. Texas was the first southern state and ninth
state in the nation to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment. Id. See generally SETH S. MCKAY,
MAKING THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION OF 1876 96-98, 124 (1924) (discussing suffrage in Texas).
26. John Walker Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case Study of
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tution proved to be among the first fruits of the profoundly democratic, populist revolt that swept through Texas and many other areas
of the country.
C. The 1876 Bill of Rights
The 1876 constitution had twenty-nine bill of rights sections, one
less than the original proposals introduced at the 1875 convention.27
Since that time, Texas voters have amended the bill of rights eight
times, 28 generally strengthening it.
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Texas Bill of Rights appears in Article I, at the very beginning of the state charter.29 In fact,
Article I introduces the bill of rights as the constitution's means of
recognizing and establishing the "general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government." 3 ° The provisions of Article I
divide into three general groupings: political and philosophical utterances concerning the nature of government and its role with respect
to individuals, 31 statements of substantive liberties and property
rights,32 and guarantees for civil and criminal procedures.33 The
thrust of the expanded bill of rights which emerged in 1875 exemplifies the effort to limit government by carefully delineating the basic,
Texas 16-17, 191, 201, 225-26, 237-40 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with St.
Mary's Law Journal) (citing DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1875 149 (Seth S. McKay ed., 1920)); see Shepherd v. San Jacinto Junior College Dist., 363
S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1962) (stating that Texas Constitution, "unlike the federal constitution,
is in no sense a grant of power but operates solely as a limitation of power").

27. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, BEGUN
AND HELD AT THE CITY OF AUSTIN, SEPTEMBER 6TH, 1875 271-75 (Sept. 6, 1875) (available
from Texas State Archives). The original Section 29, which addressed emigration from and
immigration to Texas, was not included in the 1876 constitution. Compare id. with TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 29 (illustrating that section on immigration/emigration not part of 1876
constitution).
28. Those modifications are: in 1918, § 10 (rights of accused in criminal prosecutions); in
1935, § 15 (right of trial by jury); in 1956, § 1la (multiple convictions; denial of bail), in 1956,
§ 15a (commitment of persons of unsound mind) (and amended in 1977); in 1972, § 3a (equality under the law); in 1985, § 20 (outlawry or transportation offense); and, in 1989, § 30 (rights
of crime victims). TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 3a, 10, lla, 15, 15a, 20, 30.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

TEX.
Id.
TEX.
TEX.
TEX.

CONST. art. I, pmbl.
CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2, 24, 29.
CONST. art. I, §§ 3-4, 6-8, 11-14, 16-23, 25-27.
CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 8-16, 28, 30. See generally GEORGE D. BRADEN, THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

2-4 (1977) (discussing need to state precisely which "natural and unalienable rights" were
fundamental to social contract philosophy).
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core rights of individuals which the state cannot abridge 34 and must
defend. 5
III. MODES OF ANALYSIS
State courts typically address bill of rights issues using one of three
modes: the "dual reliance," "primacy," and supplemental" or "interstitial" approaches. Each has strengths and weaknesses that suggest a
fourth, probably more effective, approach.
A.

Dual Reliance
"Dual reliance," ' 36 a technique often used by the Texas Court of
39
38
Criminal Appeals 37 and favored by the Vermont and Maryland
Supreme Courts, evaluates federal and state constitutional guarantees
separately, but in that order. Either the federal or state bill of rights
might be applicable. However, both or neither of the documents
might control.
The theoretical underpinning of "dual reliance" is that two government structures protect individual rights. However, the analysis is
not so successful as its simplicity suggests, primarily because it tends
to focus more attention on the federal guarantees. Thus, when a court
analyzes the Texas Bill of Rights, the court generally does so in a
secondary and cursory fashion, applying federal-like doctrine and
34. Ex parte Brown, 38 Tex. Crim. 295, 304, 42 S.W. 554, 556 (1897) (stating that the
"Bill of Rights lays down the ancient limitations which have always been considered essential
in a constitutional government").
35. See James P. Hart, The Bill of Rights: Safeguard of Individual Liberty, 35 TEX. L.
REV. 919, 919 (1957) (recognizing that "majorities can be as ruthless as monarchs"); Arvel
(Rod) Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 93, 104
(1988) (clarifying that all "free men" have equal rights).
36. See Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancingthe Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 983-86 (1985)
(explaining approach when state courts use both state and federal constitutions when deciding
constitutional issues); Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court
Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional
Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1028-29 (1985) (describing approach to interpreting constitutional issues).
37. See McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (considering
both Texas and federal constitutional claims in criminal appellate review).
38. See State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 346-47 (Vt. 1982) (considering overlapping protections of both Vermont and United States Constitutions in criminal procedural laws).
39. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 780-81 (Md. 1983)
(giving consideration to Federal Equal Protection Clause and Maryland's equal treatment provisions in public school financing case).
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often slighting an independent state approach."
B.

Primacy Method
The supreme courts of Oregon,4 1 New Hampshire,4 2 Maine,4 3

Washington," and Missouri 45-and sometimes Texas 46-tend to
favor the "primacy" approach. This method essentially assumes that
the states are the primary guarantors of individual rights. The approach is grounded in history; most of the original states' charters
predated, and some served as models for, the federal version.47
The "primacy" method looks first at state constitutional guarantees. If it finds protection, inquiry stops. If the state document does
not provide protection, the court proceeds to federal law. Unfortunately, this approach often leaves unexplored the possibility that federal law might offer greater protection than state law in a particular
situation. The result is a less-than-complete analysis, creating difficulties when courts try to apply the particular right in a subsequent case.
The "primacy" mode also lacks a certain realism by assuming that
state constitutions are always, or should always be, the principal guarantors of individual liberty. History and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence show otherwise.

40. See Solis v. State, 718 S.W.2d 282, 284-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (considering only federal constitutional issues in claim of right to counsel at probation revocation
hearing).
41. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981) (declaring that state constitutional
claims must be considered before federal constitutional claims).
42. E.g., State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 354 (N.H. 1983) (addressing New Hampshire constitutional guarantees before federal constitutional guarantees).
43. E.g., City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985); State v. Cadman,
476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984).
44. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 137 (Wash. 1984) (reviewing validity of
search warrant under Washington Constitution).
45. See, e.g., Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (illustrating that Missouri Constitution protects some rights not enumerated by United States
Constitution).
46. Eg., Haynes v. City of Abilene, 659 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. 1983); Sax v. Votteler, 648
S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983).
47. See generally Robert Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 371 (1984) (recognizing that "backwards" privileges and immunities clause exists in several state constitutions
which predate federal constitution).
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Supplemental Approach
The "supplemental" or "interstitial" method4 8 has been adopted by

the high courts of New Jersey49 and Connecticut," ° and the method is
often used by Texas courts .5 Under this method, the court first examines federal law. If it finds protection, analysis ends. If the court
finds no federal protection, it proceeds to the state constitution which
may provide relief.
The "interstitial" mode often undermines the integrity of the state

court decisional process, resting as it does on federal analysis first. In
recent years, the United States Supreme Court increasingly faults and
reverses federal law interpretation by state judges. If a remand follows, and if the state court has properly couched its earlier opinion on
independent grounds, the state court can then apply state law. If the
state court has not used independent grounds, the Supreme Court's
construction controls.
The supplemental approach has many faults. Not only does this
approach prolong litigation, but it increases the risk that, because of
pressure created by the Supreme Court's reversal, the state court
might revise its own analysis and essentially reverse itself. Montana, 2
48. See Robert A. Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 465, 468 (1985) (discussing function of state constitutions to supplement); Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court
Comments on Federal ConstitutionalIssues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional
Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1028-29 (1985) (describing interstitial model of state constitutional analysis).
49. State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 650 (N.J. 1983); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d
925, 931-32 (N.J. 1982).
50. E.g., Horton v. Meskill, 332 A.2d 113, 118-19 (Conn. 1974) (first looking to federal
law and then using own constitution to invalidate school financing system).
51. E.g., Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1985) (considering Supreme
Court handling of statute); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning, 86 Tex. 654, 656-57, 26
S.W. 982, 983 (1894) (court looking to United States Constitution in its analysis of statute at
issue).
52. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions- The Montana Disaster,63
TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1108-10 (1985) (discussing Montana Supreme Court's reversing itself on
remand from United States Supreme Court). But see State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254-55
(Mont. 1986) (refusing to "march lock-step" with United States Supreme Court on constitutional issues).
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South Dakota,5 3 Michigan,5 4 and Texas 5" have shared this unfortunate experience. A more philosophical objection to the supplemental
approach is its implicit acceptance of federal primacy in protecting
personal liberties.
D. The Federalism Method
The "federalism" technique is probably the best method of analyzing bill of rights arguments and is similar to that sometimes used by
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.5 1 Under this tack, one separately approaches the problem under both state and national constitutions,57 in that order. This process is more likely to preserve the
integrity of the state decision and recognize the federal-state partnership in guaranteeing individual freedoms and civil rights.
As part of the state analysis, the court must clearly declare that the
decision rests wholly upon independent state grounds and that, insofar as the state resolution of the case is concerned, there is no reliance
on federal law. 58 The state law discussion should avoid use of federal
decisions, even for non-controlling methodology. The United States
Supreme Court has shown a willingness to reverse cases where a state
judge "misunderstood" or "misapplied" federal analysis that formed
an integral part of the state decision.59 When it is clear that federal
53. See State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723, 725-26 (S.D. 1981) (holding that evidence of
defendant's refusal to take blood alcohol test is relevant), rev'd, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and on
remand, 346 N.W.2d 425, 430 (S.D. 1984) (reasoning that same refusal to take blood alcohol
test was inadmissible).
54. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1053 (1983) (reversing and remanding case to
evaluate permissibility of warrantless search).
55. See Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (using
plain view doctrine to determine constitutionality of seizure), rev'd, 460 U.S. 730, and on remand, 657 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (relying on United States Constitution to determine constitutionality of seizure).
56. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (declining to follow necessarily United States Supreme Court decisions); McCambridge v. State, 712
S.W.2d 499, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (requiring separate analysis of federal and
state issues); see also Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc)
(applying Texas and United States Constitutions to determine right of confrontation).
57. See, e.g., State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1018-19 (R.I.) (examining state's search
and seizure law and then determining its constitutionality), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
58. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-40 (1983) (verifying decision rests
wholly on non-federal grounds); In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1987) (stating that
when deciding case on Texas Equal Rights Amendment, United States Constitution does not
apply).
59. David A. Schlueter, Judicial Federalism and Supreme Court Review of State Court
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law does not apply, it is best to note that' or avoid mentioning it
altogether, adding in either case the independent state grounds
disclaimer.
The chief benefit of the "federalism" method is that it affords state
courts the opportunity to apply both state and federal constitutions
separately, according to the history, purpose, and development of
each. Not only will this yield a coherent state jurisprudence, but it
will attract the respect of other judiciaries.
IV.

DIFFERENTIATING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

Interpreting a state bill of rights document requires discerning the
intent of the framers and voters regarding the provision in question.
This involves analyzing textual, structural, historical, and comparative factors, as well as exploring policy rationales behind the
61
provision.
Oliver Wendell Holmes's comments in 1914 are as applicable to the
Texas Constitution as they are to the federal:
The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form: they are organic living institutions....
Their significance is vital, not formal: it is to be gathered not simply by
taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and
the line of their growth.62

Thus, for Texans, one must not only decipher the intent of Jefferson,
Madison, Washington, Franklin, and Hamilton, but also of Houston,
Rusk, Ellis, de Zavala, Navarro, Hogg, Ochiltree, Throckmorton,
Johnson, the Grangers, and those other earlier Texans who sought a
land where they would be treated fairly and could live with few government intrusions.6 3
Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1095 (1984); Ronald
K. L. Collins, PlainStatements: The Supreme Court's New Requirement, A.B.A. J. Mar. 1984,
at 92-94 (1984).
60. E.g., Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1985).
61. See Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 394, 40 S.W.2d 31, 35 (1931) (giving effect to
constitutional provision in light of policy goals at time of adoption and general rules of construction). Professor Bobbitt would also urge doctrinal, prudential, and ethical analyses.
PHILIP C. BoBBTr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 34-37, 93-119 (1982).
62. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
63. See Bell v. Indian Live-Stock Co., 11 S.W. 344, 345 (Tex. 1889) (referencing intentions of framers as inuring benefits to Texas residents and non-residents); see also Eisenhauer v.
State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 166-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (referencing intentions of early Texans).
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Using a historical perspective, one must also reflect on what a constitutional guarantee was designed to accomplish. The specific protection must be respected not just for itself standing alone, but also in the
context of the entire bill of rights.'
V.

A.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

General Principles

Along with selecting a mode of analysis, differentiating a constitutional provision entails applying the general rules of construction that
Texas courts have devised over the years as they interpreted state constitutional provisions. These rules call for a liberal construction of the
bill of rights. 65 The rules also incorporate the basic premise that the
Texas Constitution is "a chart containing limitations on power. "66
The fundamental thrust of constitutional construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the framers, considering when necessary the (1) conditions, (2) general spirit, and (3) overall sentiments of
the people when the provision was adopted. 67 If the constitutional
convention addressed a specific topic in the document itself, the lan64. See, e.g., Pierson v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 15, 19, 177 S.W.2d 975, 977 (1944) (reviewing intentions of framers); Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 102, 45 S.W.2d 130, 133 (1931)
(reasoning that judicial interpretation of constitutional provision may be guided by legislative
action contemporaneous with constitutional provision); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812813 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (setting out six criteria for determining whether state constitution
extends broader rights than federal). Washington's Supreme Court considered the following
factors: (1) the state constitution's explicit language; (2) textual differences between parallel
state and federal constitutions; (3) state common law and constitutional history; (4) pre-existing state case and statutory law; (5) structural differences between the state and federal
constitutions such as grants of enumerated powers, limitations on sovereign power, and affirmation of fundamental rights; and (6) matters of local and state interests. Id.; see also State v.
Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (considering same factors in
Gunwall, as well as state traditions, legislative history, and public attitudes).
65. Ex parte Brown, 38 Tex. Crim. 295, 304, 42 S.W. 554, 556 (1897).
66. Ex parte Myer, 84 Tex. Crim. 288, 297, 207 S.W. 100, 104 (1918); see Friedman v.
American Surety Co. of N.Y., 137 Tex. 149, 166, 151 S.W.2d 570, 580 (1941) (stating that
constitutional provisions may be submitted to voters to enable legislature to interpret people's
will); Ferguson v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 280, 289, 28 S.W.2d 526, 530 (1930) (discussing limits on
state government); Brown, 38 Tex. Crim. at 303, 42 S.W. at 555 (citing with approval State v.
Gilman, 10 S.E. 283, 284 (W. Va. 1889) and finding that under constitution, government may
prescribe restraints for general good); Watts v. Mann, 187 S.W.2d 917, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1945, writ ref'd) (finding that act of state legislature is legal when not constitutionally
prohibited).
67. See Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271, 285, 167 S.W.2d 147, 154 (1942) (finding that
constitutional provision should not be given technical construction which would defeat its
purpose); see also Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 393, 40 S.W.2d 31, 36 (1931) (interpreting
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guage selected by the framers of the constitution, when its meaning is
clear, controls the court's interpretation.6 8 This rule allows particular
and specific intention to guide the decision when it is plainly
expressed.69
Whenever the constitution declares how power may be exercised
over a specific subject, no power can be exercised other than that
"clearly within the plain import" of the constitutional language. 70
The same guiding principles apply to constitutional amendments
upon which the people have clearly expressed their will: "[T]hose
who are called upon to construe the Constitution are not authorized
to thwart the will of the people by reading into the Constitution language not contained therein, or by construing it differently from its
plain language adopted by them. ' 7 1 In fact, some amendments have
been submitted to the voters, not "to create a legislative power," but
to ascertain the will of the people regarding a governmental policy.7 2
Ideally, the significance of a phrase or clause will be "plainly discoverable" from the words themselves. The language will be considered to
have been used "in [its] natural sense and ordinary significance unless
the context indicates the contrary."7 3 Also, one must presume that
the words were carefully selected and used as people generally understood them at the time of adopting the constitution. 4
One should also consult common law that "limits and determines
the meaning of words and phrases used in the Constitution when the
context or some other provision of the instrument or some previous
enactment existing when the Organic Law was framed does not deter-

constitutional provisions in light of time of their adoption, policy goals, and general rules of
construction).
68. Gallagher v. State, 690 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc); Myer, 84
Tex. Crim. at 296, 207 S.W. at 103.
69. See County of Harris v. Sheppard, 156 Tex. 18, 25-26, 291 S.W.2d 721, 726 (1956)
(stating that constitutional provisions delineating particular intention would be classified as

exception to general provision).
70. Myer, 84 Tex. Crim. at 297, 207 S.W. at 104; Exparte Foster, 44 Tex. Crim. 423, 428,
71 S.W. 593, 596 (1903).
71. Cramer, 140 Tex. at 283-84, 167 S.W.2d at 154.
72. Friedman, 137 Tex. at 166, 151 S.W.2d at 580.
73. Gallagher,690 S.W.2d at 592.
74. Id. at 592 (citing Cramer, 140 Tex. at 283-84, 167 S.W.2d at 154); Ferguson, 119 Tex.
at 289, 28 S.W.2d at 530; Kemper v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 1, 29-40, 138 S.W. 1025, 1039-45
(1911).
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mine them."'75 It is also proper to use a law dictionary, like Black's or
Ballentine's, for a definition of commonly understood terms. 7 6 Often,
generic terms, like "insurance," "search," and "seizure," were intended to include future things not within human experience or
knowledge. 7
Likewise, courts must assume that the people, in adopting constitutional texts, carefully selected the language and intended to give each
text its own effect. 78 Thus, a court must construe all the constitutional provisions together and, if possible, give effect to all of them.79
One may not assume that "separate and distinct provisions were intended to have the same and no other effect that one of them has,
unless the language used, when considered in connection with the
whole instrument," demonstrates this must have been the intent.8 0
Judges may not question the wisdom of a constitutional provision,
and must, where the language is "plain," give it "full effect 2without
regard to the consequences"'" and must protect its dignity.
What is the approach, however, when the language is not plain?
First, constitutional provisions may not be given a "technical construction which would defeat their purpose. 81 3 When a provision is
open to more than one understanding, it "will not be so construed or
75. Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 564, 62 S.W.2d 641, 647 (1933); Chapin v. State,
107 Tex. Crim. 477, 479-80, 296 S.W. 1095, 1097 (1927).
76. See Gallagher, 690 S.W.2d at 592 (relying on Ballentine's definition of "official misconduct"); see RONALD D. ROTUNDA, ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 23.24,
at 668 (1992) (stating words in constitution have normal and ordinary meaning).
77. See Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 465, 221 S.W. 880, 918 (1920) (recognizing that
generic terms may include classes not yet devised).
78. Hanson v. Jordan, 145 Tex. 320, 323, 198 S.W.2d 262, 263 (1946); Mellinger v. City
of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 44, 3 S.W. 249, 252 (1887); see San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. State, 128
Tex. 33, 35, 95 S.W.2d 680, 687 (1936) (recognizing that legislative intent should govern statutory construction).
79. See Duncan v. Gabler, 147 Tex. 229, 234, 215 S.W.2d 155, 159 (1948) (recognizing
established rule for interpreting constitutional provisions together).
80. Mellinger, 68 Tex. at 44, 3 S.W. at 252.
81. Gallagher, 690 S.W.2d at 591; see Cramer, 140 Tex. at 285, 167 S.W.2d at 154 (observing that interpretation of constitutional provision should not defeat its own purpose);
Lewis v. Independent Sch. Dist. of Austin, 139 Tex. 83, 88, 161 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (1942)
(applying "clear & unambiguous" constitutional language); Koy, 110 Tex. at 413, 221 S.W.at
891 (construing ordinary words in light of historical use and meaning); Keller v. State, 87 S.W.
669, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905) (stating that plain and definite constitutional language should
be taken on ordinary meaning and acceptance). Koy, Myer, Cramer, and Gallagher are four
leading cases on constitutional construction.
82, In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987).
83. Cramer, 140 Tex. at 284-85, 167 S.W.2d at 154.
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interpreted as to lead to absurd conclusions, if any other construction
or interpretation can reasonably be indulged in."8 4 And the court
should avoid, whenever possible, construing a constitutional section
so as to render it ambiguous or contradictory to another section. 5
The same standards apply when interpreting different constitutional provisions ,that appear to conflict with each other. The court
must first determine that it is impossible to harmonize the provisions
by a reasonable construction. 6 If a subsequent constitutional amendment is involved, the presumption is that the latter controls since it is
'
the "latest expression of the will of the people." 87
The courts view an
amendment as an integral part of the original constitution which explains and qualifies every other part of the constitution. 8
One should also consider legislative interpretation and court decisions rendered during the period between one constitution and the
adoption of a successor. If there were no textual changes, the legislative and judicial gloss placed on the earlier version becomes part of
the subsequent document 9 because the "voters are presumed to have
adopted the construction of a word or phrase which has been placed
thereon by the courts." 90 When a specific legal phrase or term received a judicial construction prior to its incorporation into the constitution, the inference is that the construction continues to bear the
84. See id. at 294, 167 S.W.2d at 159 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting) (citing Koy, 110 Tex. at

369, 221 S.W. at 880).
85. Gallagher, 690 S.W.2d at 591-92.
86. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633-35 (Tex. 1986); Duncan, 147 Tex. at
233, 215 S.W.2d at 159; Collingsworth County v. Allred, 120 Tex. 473, 481, 40 S.W.2d 13, 16
(1931); see Sheppard, 156 Tex. at 26, 291 S.W.2d at 726 (stating if section of constitution
expresses general intention and another section expresses particular intention incompatible
with general, particular is to be considered exception to general); San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co.,
128 Tex. at 42, 95 S.W.2d at 685 (holding that where provisions cannot be harmonized, more
specific provision controls); cf Conley v. Daughters of the Republic, 106 Tex, 80, 92, 156 S.W.
197, 201-02 (1913) (stating that statutes relating to same subject are to be taken together so
effect may be given to each); Pittman v. Byars, 112 S.W. 102, 106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no
writ) (reasoning that similar language in present and prior constitutions gives rise to presumption that prior interpretations of language control).
87. Farrar v. Board of Trustees of Employment Retirement Sys. of Tex., 150 Tex. 572,
577, 243 S.W.2d 688, 692 (1951); Cramer, 140 Tex. at 280, 167 S.W.2d at 152; State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 440, 61 S.W. 114, 115 (1901); Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Rainbolt, 67 Tex.
654, 656, 4 S.W. 356, 357 (1887).
88. Allred, 120 Tex. at 479, 40 S.W.2d at 15.
89. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 340 (Tex. 1986).
90. City of El Paso v. El Paso Community College Dist., 729 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1986)
(citing Richey v. Moor, 112 Tex. 493, 497, 249 S.W. 172, 173 (1923)); Pittman, 112 S.W. at
103.
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same significance. 9 These rules also hold for constitutional provisions adopted from other states or countries such as Mexico or England.92 Some deference is paid to these other jurisdictions' judicial
interpretations issued subsequent to Texas's own adoption of the
93
provision.
Contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of a constitutional provision are also persuasive94 and carry great weight when
they go unchallenged for a long period of time, particularly if the provision is less than clear. 95 Nonetheless, no amount of acquiescence
can legalize an usurpation of power or thwart96the will of the people
which is plainly expressed in the constitution.
Often, constitutional provisions are viewed as "organic codifications" of common law principles. In such cases, the common law
tradition may help guide the exegesis. 97
Another crucial step is to examine state statutory and case law predating Federal Supreme Court cases that construed comparable federal constitutional protections and required their observance in the
states. For example, Texas courts interpreted the state's free speech
and assembly provisions long before the First Amendment applied to
the states. How Texas courts and citizens understood the tradition
behind those guarantees prior to the extension of the First Amendment is critical in discerning constitutional intent. 98
91. El Paso Community College, 729 S.W.2d at 299 (citing Richey, 112 Tex. at 497, 249
S.W. at 173); Gallagher,690 S.W.2d at 592; Chapin, 107 Tex. Crim. at 486, 296 S.W. at 1100;
Carr v. Tucker, 42 Tex. 330, 332-35 (1875); Pittman, 112 S.W. at 106.
92. Koy, 110 Tex. at 409-10, 221 S.W. at 889-90; Robertson v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 216,
241, 142 S.W. 533, 546 (1912); State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353, 359-60 (Wash. 1984).
93. Koy, 110 Tex. at 410, 221 S.W. at 890.
94. Id. at 401, 221 S.W. at 885.
95. Markowsky v. Newman, 134 Tex. 440, 449, 136 S.W.2d 808, 813 (1940); Allred, 120
Tex. at 480, 40 S.W.2d at 16.
96. See, e.g., City of Fort Worth v. Howerton, 149 Tex. 614, 620, 236 S.W.2d 615, 618
(1951) (holding that legislature cannot pass laws which are contrary to constitution); Ex parte
Heyman, 45 Tex. Crim. 532, 543, 78 S.W. 349, 354 (1904) (acquiescence cannot legalize usurpation of power); Kimbrough v. Barnett, 93 Tex. 301, 313, 55 S.W. 120, 123 (1900) (stating
that court bound to follow constitution framed by people).
97. See, e.g., Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) (free speech); Austin &
N.W. Ry. Co. v. Cluck, 97 Tex. 172, 176, 77 S.W. 403, 404 (1903) (privacy); see also Ellen A.
Peters, Common Law Antecedents of ConstitutionalLaw in Connecticut, 53 ALB. L. REV. 259,
261 (1989) (explaining that many constitutional rights had common law antecedents).
98. See, e.g., Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 7-10 (Tex. 1992) (discussing free expression tradition in Texas); Joseph H. Hart, FreeSpeech on PrivateProperty. When Fundamental
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B. Specific Rules of Constructionfor the Bill of Rights
Four important rules apply to construing bill of rights guarantees.
First, courts must construe the bill of rights liberally.9 9 The second

rule recognizes the unique role of the bill of rights in protecting personal freedoms: when personal liberties guaranteed by the constitution are at stake, courts must apply "an individual rights perspective,"
rather than "a societal perspective." °° Third, the bill of rights is not

"a series of one-dimensional rules to be applied blindly," but is "a
guiding norm and principle to be applied and interpreted by the
courts."10 1 Finally, at least as to some bill of rights protections, the
courts should liberally apply remedial relief.102 This is a well-recognized and time-honored exception to the general principles of Texas
03
constitutional construction. The Texas Equal Rights Amendment
is a classic remedial example, and its required liberality might
strengthen arguments in favor of the per se or "plain language" rule.
Banning discrimination without qualification might also support the
contention that the amendment should be extended to some non-government sectors or should be applied using less rigorous tests, such as
requiring only a showing of discriminatory effect rather than discriminatory intent.' ° 4

Rights Collide, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1469, 1475 (1990) (stating that framers of Texas Constitution
wanted greater speech protection).
99. See generally Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc)
(holding search and seizure unlawful because balloon is not inherently suspicious), rev'd, 460
U.S. 730 (1983).
100. LeCroy v. Harlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex. 1986); see DuPuy v. Waco, 396
S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. 1965) (reasoning that individual property rights must be protected and
society must equally bear cost of progress).
101. In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987); see State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436,
440, 61 S.W. 114, 115 (1901) (holding that even though no express provision exists, legislature
can create school districts).
102. Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 448, 221 S.W. 880, 909 (1920) (discussing liberal
rule for construing remedial relief provisions in statutes and constitutions).
103. "Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color,
creed, or national origin .... " TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
104. See JAMES C. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND
LITIGATION MANUAL 72 (stating that "the plain wording of the equal rights amendment prohibits discrimination without qualification"); see also Guadalupe Mena v. Ann Richards, No.
C-454-91-F (Dist. Ct. of Hidalgo County, 332d Judicial Dist. of Tex., Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Sept. 27, 1991) (copy on file with St. Mary's Law Journal)(finding redistricting plans violate Texas Equal Rights Amendment because plans had discriminatory impact); Enrique Lopez v. Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 475,874 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County,
261st Judicial Dist. of Tex., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, May 21, 1991) (copy on
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C.

Rule of Statutory Construction
The Texas Government Code sets out principles that, though applicable to construing statutes, may be helpful, at least by analogy, when
courts interpret constitutional provisions. 10 5 Most of these rules are
similar to those devised by the courts for constitutional interpretation.
VI.
A.

TEXTUAL ANALYSES

Variationsof Text

It is now axiomatic that the United States Constitution sets the
"floor" of constitutional protection and the Texas Constitution sets
the "ceiling." 10 6 The state constitution can give "protection to rights
...which the constitution of the United States does not give;" ' 7 and
that additional protection is often indicated, and required, by the very
08
language of the Texas Bill of Rights.
The most common textual approach is to compare variations between the national and state constitutions. 109 State bills of rights typically have unique guarantees not found in their federal counterpart,
evidencing greater protection." 0 For example, Texas has an equal
rights amendment flatly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race, ethnic origin, color, sex, or creed, but the United States Constifile with St. Mary's Law Journal) (concluding school district's election system violates Texas
Equal Rights Amendment because of discriminatory impact).
105. TEX. Gov'T CODE §§ 311.021-311.032, 312.001-312.013 (Vernon 1988 & Vernon
Supp. 1991).
106. See LeCroy v. Harlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986) (explaining that "while state
constitutions cannot subtract from rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, state
constitutions can and often do provide additional rights for their citizens"); but see Andrews v.
State, 652 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (suggesting that state can find
less-than-federal protection).
107. Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1985); see also Mellinger v. City of
Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 44, 3 S.W. 249, 252 (1887) (holding that rights protected by United
States Constitution are as fully protected by state constitutions).
108. See, e.g., Leander Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d
908, 912 (Tex. 1972) (enforcing higher burden than United States Constitution by requiring
that property exempted under Texas Constitution be used for public purposes and be "public
property"); Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271, 281-82, 167 S.W.2d 147, 152-53 (1942) (holding that state statute prohibiting state officer from holding more than one position does not
conflict with United States Constitution); Mellinger, 68 Tex. at 44, 3 S.W. at 252 (finding that
Texas Constitution prohibits ex post facto law in contracts but United States Constitution does
not address issue).
109. See generally PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 25-38 (1982) (presenting
overview of textual analysis approach).
110. LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 338.
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tution has no parallel provision.1 1 ' The Texas Bill of Rights also has
two due process guarantees.' 12 Texas provides significantly different,
and arguably greater, constitutional rights for the free exercise of religion 1 3 and against the entanglement of church and state." 4 Conversely, the Texas Constitution often requires a generalized belief in
"a Supreme Being."' 15
A second textual method is to examine linguistic structure.16 For
example, various states like Texas have free speech and assembly protections framed as affirmative rights rather than simply as restrictions
on government power. 1 7 These more expansive guarantees, which
are recognized by the Federal Supreme Court to be within a state's
"sovereign right," offer a significant distinction upon which judges
rely to construe state constitutions.' 18

111.

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. Texas did ratify the Federal Equal Rights Amendment in

1972, but a majority of states failed to adopt it. See Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees
in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1212, 1212-14 (1985) (discussing state equal
rights provisions).
112. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 19; see LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 340-41 (discussing separate
guarantees provided by §§ 13 and 19).
113. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 4-7; see Exparte Luehr, 159 Tex. Crim. 566, 569, 266 S.W.2d
375, 377 (1954) (invalidating ban on door-to-door proselytizing); Juarez v. State, 102 Tex.
Crim. 297, 305, 277 S.W. 1091, 1094-95 (1925) (prohibiting exclusion of Catholics from grand
juries).
114. See Bullock v. Texas Monthly, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 160, 166-67 n. I (Tex. App.-Austin
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Carroll, J., dissenting) (providing textual and historical analyses of
Texas Constitution), rev'd sub nom. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 20 (1989)
(noting overriding interest in keeping government out of religious matters).
115. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art I, § 4 (providing that no one be excluded from holding
office on account of religious sentiment provided person acknowledges existence of Supreme
Being).
116. E.g., LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339 (stating, "all-inclusive language contrasts with qualifying language used in other sections").
117. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign v. Barton Creek Square Shopping Ctr.,
No. 349,268 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Tex., letter decision, July 13,
1983) (copy on file with St. Mary's Law Journal)(stating that Texas Constitution grants affirmative rights); James C. Harrington, Free Speech, Press, and Assembly Liberties under the Texas
Bill of Rights, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 1443 (1990) (discussing First Amendment as limit on
government censorship versus Texas Constitution conferring affirmative communicative
rights); see also Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, no writ) (stating difference between free speech in United States Constitution and
free speech in Texas Constitution is affirmative versus negative terms); Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1987, writ denied) (stating affirmative right of individual free speech), cert. denied, 102 U.S. 47
(1988).
118. PrnneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); O'Quinn v. State Bar
of Tex., 763 S.W.2d 397, 402-03 (Tex. 1988); see also Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 308-10
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A third textual process is to consider the phrasing of the language.
The federal ban on "cruel and unusual" punishment differs from the
disjunctive "cruel or unusual" punishment in various state charters,
including the Texas Constitution. The California Supreme Court relied on that variance to abolish capital punishment,1 9 although
United States Justices reached a different conclusion when analyzing
the federal "cruel and unusual" phrase.' 2° Alaska similarly interpreted its search and seizure provision more expansively, though, except for the phrase "and other property," the Alaskan provision is
121
identical to the Fourth Amendment.
It is often helpful to examine how a sister-state has interpreted a
similar constitutional provision,1 2 2 especially ifthat provision and the
Texas version share a common origin or were drafted near the same

time. 123
B.

Non- Variations in Text

Obviously, when the language of the Texas Constitution differs
from its federal counterpart, it is usually easier "to ascertain and give
effect to the plain intent and language of the framers of a constitutional amendment and of the people who adopted it.",124 But how
n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (applying right to confrontation under Texas Constitution as compared to United States Constitution); LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339 (noting that state
constitution provides additional rights for state citizens).
119. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (later overturned by constitutional amendment). Texas, however, has upheld capital punishment. See Black v. State, 816
S.W.2d 350, 360-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (noting that death penalty was not
imposed arbitrarily).
120. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976) (rejecting argument that death
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for the reasons stated in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 168-87 (1976)).
121. Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 716, 718 (Alaska 1963).
122. E.g., White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 585-86, 196 S.W. 508, 512 (1917) (looking to
language of sister-state constitutions to uphold right to trial by jury); Robertson v. State, 63
Tex. Crim. 216, 226-28, 142 S.W. 533, 534 (1912) (noting Texas confrontation provision was
borrowed from other state constitutions); Bell v. Indian Livestock Co., I I S.W. 344, 345-46
(Tex. 1889) (comparing garnishment provision to similar laws of other states).
123. See, e.g., Steddum v. Kirby Lumber Co., I10 Tex. 513, 519-21, 221 S.W. 920, 921-22
(1920) (addressing due process provision as construed by state and federal governments); Robertson, 63 Tex. Crim. at 226-228, 142 S.W. at 533-34 (first analyzing cross-examination rule of
33 states and then reviewing federal rule); Bell, 11 S.W. at 345 (comparing due process laws of
several states with United States Constitution).
124. Gragg v. Cayuga Indep. Sch. Dist., 539 S.W.2d 861, 865-66 (Tex.), appeal dism'd,
429 U.S. 973 (1976); see also Gallagher v. State, 690 S.W.2d 587, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
(considering intent and language of framers).
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should a court interpret language that is close to or apparently inconsequentially different from the Federal Bill of Rights? Or how should
a court react when the documents share similar language in one section but the documents are significantly dissimilar overall? Would it
make sense, historically or conceptually, to argue that because the
wording of the Texas and United States search and seizure protec25
tions are similar, judges must apply uniform interpretation?
Such a concession to uniformity lacks appreciation for the federalism that binds the nation together, and it deprives Texas judges and
legal scholars of the opportunity to fashion case law that might address problems of Texans better than might federal decisions. 26 After
all, federal doctrines evolved over scores of years and carry their own
historical encrustation. Why assume that Texas courts would not
learn from that experience and craft their own constitutional jurisprudence? Our forebears surely would have rejected the notion that the
fundamental state charter, drafted after years of rugged experience
and molded after reflection on the constitutions of other states, could
diminish in meaning each time the United States Supreme Court issued a new ruling. 127 Moreover, the Federal Bill of Rights was not
originally intended to apply to the day-to-day relations between the
people and the state, but to their relation with the federal government.
Indeed, many state bills of rights predated and set the model for the
United States Constitution. 2 '
Textual similarity should mean nothing more, and nothing less,
than that the words are alike. The meaning and application of the
rights behind the language are left to the wisdom and jurisprudence of
the courts.' 2 9 Former Justice Hans Linde addressed the same issue
125. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in a well-reasoned and comprehensive opinion, has indicated that the time has come to construe the Texas and federal search and seizure
provisions independently, although phrased alike. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 691
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
126. See George E. Dix, Judicial Independence in Defining Criminal Defendants' Texas
Constitutional Rights, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1370-71 (1990) (discussing individual state's
needs to reflect own tradition and heritage).
127. See Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (Miller,
J., dissenting) (arguing for interpreting Texas Constitution independently of United States
Constitution); Kemper v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 1, 41, 138 S.W. 1025, 1044 (1911) (noting that
rights of Texas citizens must be recognized).
128. See Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1081, 1081-83 (1985) (noting, "The States' Early Primacy").
129. See, e.g., Osban, 726 S.W.2d at 110-11 (discussing scope of search and seizure protection); Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 702-04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (inter-
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for the State of Oregon:
The state argues that when the Oregon Constitution employs terms
"substantially identical" to those in the constitutions of the United
States or of other states, the framers of the Oregon Constitution should
be presumed to have sought to achieve the same objectives. That they
sought the same objectives is generally true in the absence of contrary
evidence. This does not, however, say much toward demonstrating the
correct application of such a constitutional text. In particular, the
proposition does not support the non sequitur that the United States
Supreme Court's decisions under such a text not only deserve respect
30
but presumptively fix its correct meaning also in state constitutions.1
Retired Justice William Brennan made a similar observation: "More
and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts
of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their
state even more protection than the federal provisions, even those
3
identically phrased.' 1
Further, Texas courts have long recognized that simply because
certain words are chosen for a constitutional text does not necessarily
mean that the words would forever have a fixed meaning:
On the contrary, it does sometimes happens that a certain word... may
be found to have been used in a sense broad enough to include things
not then within the human experience or knowledge; and especially is
that true of words of generic import-such, for illustration, as "insur32
ance," which may include classes of insurance not yet devised.'

preting constitutional self-incrimination protection); see also State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248,

1254-55 (Mont. 1986) (comparing self-incrimination rights provided by Montana and United
States Constitutions); Deras v. Meyers, 535 P.2d 541, 549 (Or. 1975) (stating United States
Constitution not controlling when state constitution provides broader protection).
130. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1322 (Or. 1983); see, e.g., Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at
689-90 (holding that even if state and federal constitutions have same language, state document can give more protections); Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 411, 221 S.W. 880, 890
(1920) (holding that where similar clauses imported into constitution from other state, any
subsequent construction thereof by courts of such state merely persuasive); Mellinger v. City of
Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 42, 3 S.W. 249, 252-53 (1887) (where section of constitution not fully
construed when adopted, later interpretations not held to be people's intent when adopted); see
also State v. Newman, 696 P.2d 856, 861 n.6 (Idaho 1985) (stating that federal principles are
equally sound under state's constitution); Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 500-01 (Mont. 1985)
(requiring that statute meet strict scrutiny standards under state and federal constitutions).
131. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
132. See Collingsworth County v. Allred, 120 Tex. 473, 480, 40 S.W.2d 13, 16 (1931)
(discussing broad powers in authorization of agencies); see Koy, 110 Tex. at 401, 221 S.W. at
885 (construing word "election" beyond its common meaning).
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Thus, even when federal and state texts read alike, state courts may
presume correctly that the voters intended different protections simply based upon the plain meaning of the language itself. That approach should not be turned about-face by assuming that, if the
language is the same, case law must be identical. No real justification
lies for presuming that construction of specific language in the United
States Constitution should control the meaning of like language in the
Texas Constitution. 133 As former Justice Franklin Spears once observed: "By enforcing our constitution, we provide
Texans with their
' 34
full individual rights and strengthen federalism.'
C.

InternalStructure

The structure of a bill of rights within a state constitution often
reflects a critical difference from the federal version. 35 For example,
a structural argument might focus on the prominent placement of the
Texas Bill of Rights at the very beginning of the constitution. 36 Such
an argument might also note the declaration contained within the preamble of Article I that the rights charter recognizes and establishes
"the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government."' 37 The Federal Bill of Rights, by contrast, was appended in
late 1791, more than two years after ratification of the Constitution.
In fact, the Article I preamble has provided an independent source
for the right of privacy which is not enumerated in the Texas Bill of
Rights. 38 The supreme court of Texas found privacy to be a fundamental right, one of those " 'general, great, and essential principles of
133. See A llred, 120 Tex. at 401, 40 S.W.2d at 16 (reasoning that language of constitution
may be given various interpretations); see also State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (Hawaii 1974)
(rejecting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and providing more protection even
though wording of Hawaiian provision was identical to Fourth Amendment).
134. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr.,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502-603
(1977)).
135. Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 401, 221 S.W. 880, 885 (1920).
136. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1992); Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d
681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
137. TEx. CONST. art. I., pmbl. Another sign of the preeminent importance of the 1876
bill of rights to the voters of Texas was reflected in the 1972 constitutional amendment allowing the assembly of the unsuccessful 1974 constitutional convention. The amendment provided that, regardless of the form of a new constitution, the "Bill of Rights of the present
[1876] Texas Constitution shall be retained in full." TEX. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2(g).
138. See Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987) (illustrating right to privacy is penumbral); James C.
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liberty and free government' established by the Texas Bill of Rights"
which the other more specific provisions in Article I were designed to
protect.' 3 9 Some private matters are not considered fundamental
rights under the United States Constitution."4
Other signals of structural variance-such as limits on government
spending-can be observed in constitutional provisions that narrow
the role of government. The Texas Constitution fashions a decentralized government with diffused power 4 ' but which expansively guarantees certain rights to the people. This document is demonstrably
different from the United States Constitution which empowers the operation of the federal government but limits that power through the
Bill of Rights and other provisions. Section 29 of the Texas Bill of
Rights is a singular guarantee that sharpens the structural difference
between the federal and state documents and rejects any state hegemony or encroachment on individual rights "which shall forever remain
inviolate."' 4 2 Whatever it means exactly, Section 29 clearly has independent vitality."'
The Texas Constitution is extremely cumbersome and is much
more detailed than the federal version. These qualities are not the
result of unartful drafting or inferior importance, but are caused by
the underlying purpose of the document. The constitution impleHarrington, Privacy and the Texas Constitution, 13 VT. L. REV. 155, 169-70 (1988) (discussing
right to privacy in Texas Constitution).
139. Texas State Employees Union, 746 S.W.2d at 205.
140. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (stating that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
141. See Vinson v. Burgess, 773 S.W.2d 263, 265-67 (Tex. 1989) (discussing intention of
Texas Constitution to provide balance of power); Shepherd v. San Jacinto Junior College Dist.,
363 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1962) (holding that Texas Constitution operates solely as limitation
on power); Solon v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 261, 266, 114 S.W. 349, 354 (1908) (on rehearing)
(holds that state constitution is limitation of and not grant of power); Mellinger v. City of
Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 42-43, 3 S.W. 249, 252-53 (1887) (stating that civil rights are protected
under 14th Amendment of United States Constitution and Article I, § 19 of Texas Constitution); see also Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 500-01 (invalidating state statute on state constitutional grounds) (Mont. 1985), overruled by Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 491
(Mont. 1989); State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1316 (Or. 1983) (noting state constitutional
limitations on power of state).
142. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 29.
143. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 51, 76 S.W.2d 1007, 1009-10 (1934)
(holding that § 29 will not allow legislature to go beyond limits set in constitution); see also
Gold v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 463, 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ) (discussing importance
and role of bill of rights); Louis Karl Bonham, Note, Unenumerated Rights Clauses in State
Constitutions, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1332-33 (1985) (stating that subscribing to idea of limited
power in state constitution will probably require unenumerated rights clause).
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ments a different political philosophy concerning the function of government and individual rights. That philosophy is reflected in the
dramatic contrast between the overall restrictiveness of the Texas
Constitution and the expansiveness of its bill of rights. Generally,
textual and structural analyses go hand-in-hand in providing insight
into the drafters' and voters' intent.
VII.
A.

OTHER MEANS OF DISCERNING THE INTENT OF THE
FRAMERS AND VOTERS

Primary and Secondary Sources

Various other methods help ascertain intent when it is not self-evident from the text or interpretive case law. One important step is to
consult primary sources, such as journals and records of the particular constitutional convention which approved the provision in question.'" Unfortunately, official convention records are sparse,
reflecting a deliberate desire to avoid lengthy, verbatim reporting of
debates and proceedings, often for reasons of economy. There are
journals for some conventions, 45 however, which are available in the
Lorenzo de Zavala state archives building and other libraries with significant Texas history holdings. The journals are the daily summaries
of the events at the respective convention and often report the general
parameters of debates.
Other sources are newspaper accounts of the conventions and diaries or notes of individuals involved in drafting the constitution. One
of the more respected newspapers during the 1875 convention was the
Galveston Daily News. The Daily News summarized the editorial positions of other newspapers and reported the diverse points made during the debate over the drafting and ratification of the 1876
constitution. Other important contemporary chronicles were the Austin Daily Democratic Statesman, Houston Daily Telegraph, Panola
Watchman, San Antonio's Herald and Daily Express, Waco Weekly
144. Eg., LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339-40 (Tex. 1986) (discussing 1875 constitutional convention's journal to ascertain intent of open courts provision in Texas
Constitution).
145. E.g., DEBATES OF THE TEXAS CONVENTION 302-13 (W.F. Weeks ed., 1846); JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS BEGUN AND HELD

AT THE CITY OF AUSTIN, SEPTEMBER 6TH, 1875 271-75 (Sept. 6, 1875) (available from Texas
State Archives); JOURNALS OF THE CONVENTION 131-35 (Miner & Cruger eds., 1845); see also
SETH S. MCKAY, MAKING THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION OF 1876 149 (1924) (providing history

of Texas constitutional development).
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Examiner and Patron (the Grange newspaper), Dallas Herald, and
Georgetown Democrat. These sources help evaluate the debates concerning particular constitutional provisions. These debates typically
occurred when a provision's "prototype" was first introduced, when
the provision was discussed in committee, and when it was considered
146
for final passage at the convention.
If a section remained unchanged when a constitution was redrafted,
it is presumed that the framers and the voters intended its meaning to
be the same as that of the original provision. 1'" If the provision was
debated and the debate recorded, intent is easily discernible and, if
ascertained, may not be thwarted by a rule of construction. 148 Once
found, the intent is "regarded [to be] as good as written into the enactment.' 419 In gleaning intent, "very great weight" is assigned to the
argument of the leading proponents of the measure. 150 If there was no
debate in the convention over the provision, then the plain meaning of
the provision is presumed. '5
The next step is to look at the public debate during the ratification
process in an attempt to reveal the voters' intent. The fact that the
1836 constitution was "the only constitution accepted without acrimony in the history of Texas' ' 52 underlines the people's scrutiny of
the constitution's language, structure, and intent. Analyzing the development of Texas free speech and assembly rights provides a good
model of how to approach this subject area.
Every constitution of Texas since 1836 has explicitly cast the com146. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to BearArms in Texas: The Intent of the
Framersof the Bills of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 629, 665-69 (1989) (discussing 1875 constitutional convention).
147. Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 466, 221 S.W. 880, 918 (Tex. 1920); see LeCroy, 713
S.W.2d at 339 (stating, "Every Texas Constitution has contained an open courts provision
with the identical wording").
148. Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271, 283-84, 167 S.W.2d 147, 154 (1943); see RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 45 (1977) (stating rules of construction not meant to
extinguish intent of framers).
149. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 137 (1977).

150. Id. at 136-37; MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 120 (1986).

151. LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 340 (noting, "Apparently, the open courts provision was
uncontroversial"). See generally A.J. Thomas, Jr. & Ann Van Wynen Thomas, The Texas
Constitution of 1876, 35 TEX. L. REV. 907, 913 (1957) (reviewing history of Texas Constitution that was proposed by common men distrustful of delegating excessive power to public
officials).
152. JOE BERTRAM FRANZ, TEXAS: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 75 (1976).
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municative rights as affirmative guarantees and has proscribed government interference with the liberty to speak, write, publish, and
assemble. This dual protection is no happenstance creation. Besides
the intent discernible from the overall thrust and structure of the state
constitution-especially the 1876 version-there are specific historical
indicators that the framers of the Texas Constitution sought to protect free expression beyond the guarantees in the federal charter.
Portions of the 1836 Declaration of Rights were at first influenced
by but soon developed beyond the First Amendment. As originally
proposed, the first sentence of Section 5 closely reflected the First
Amendment: "No law shall ever be passed to curtail the liberty of
speech or the press." This statement was followed by: "In all prosecutions for libels, the truth may be given in evidence, and the jury
shall have the right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court."' 153 Before the constitution was submitted to the
citizens of the Republic for ratification, the delegates added a sentence
to the beginning of the text: "Every citizen shall be at liberty to
speak, write, or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible
for the abuse of that privilege."' 4
The version which emerged was adopted virtually verbatim in every
subsequent constitution, 155 although its content was debated anew in
the 1845 and 1875 conventions. In the 1845 convention, the delegates, expressing dismay and alarm at the First Amendment's failure
to prevent Federalist suppression of speech, flatly rejected a proposal
which would have deleted the affirmative language from the free
56
speech provision.'

Similarly, on the convention floor in 1875, the delegates soundly
defeated an effort to base the new charter on prior constitutions, turn153. 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 859, 868 (1898).

154. Id. at 1082. The sections in the Declaration of Rights were renumbered between the
time of their proposal and their adoption; the free speech provision became Section 4. For
discussion of the "responsibility" clause, see Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989)
(explaining that "responsibility clause" does not require different standard of summary judgment for defamation cases); Ex parte Jimenez, 159 Tex. 183, 188, 317 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Tex.
1958) (rejecting argument that restrictions included in Election Code were violation of state
constitutional right to free speech).
155. See Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982) (en banc) (discussing conflict between the constitutional rights of for trials and free
press); DEBATES OF THE TEXAS CONVENTION 77 (W.F. Weeks ed., 1846) (debating gag rule
on newspapers).
156. DEBATES OF THE TEXAS CONVENTION 77-95 (W.F. Weeks ed., 1846).
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ing aside arguments that American constitutions are substantively the
same. 15 7 Not only do Sections 8 and 27 of the Texas Bill of Rights

confer affirmative communicative rights on Texans and impose stringent prohibitions on their government, but together with the general
structure of the bill of rights and the constitution, they suggest that
state government may have the affirmative duty to ensure citizens'

ability to invoke such rights of expression and assembly. The First
Amendment imposes no such obligation.
In any respect, the speech, press, and assembly protections in the

Texas Constitution depart significantly from the classic eighteenth
century model reflected in the First Amendment. 5 8 Texas judges
zealously guarded these protections long before the Supreme Court
obligated the states to extend First Amendment guarantees to their
citizens in 1925.159

Most appellate courts in Texas, including the high court,' 60 with
few exceptions"' have historically understood that Texas extends
greater freedom than does the First Amendment.'

62

The Texas

Supreme Court has expressly stated that Section 8 of Article I grants

greater liberty. 6 The courts have also understood that in implementing such enhanced protections, the "principle encouraging the
free exchange of information and ideas" should guide their deci-

157. See SETH S. MCKAY, MAKING THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION OF 1876 43-45 (discussing constitutional development).
158. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1642-43 (1967) (reflecting romantic view of First Amendment that without government intervention there is "free market" mechanism for protecting ideas).
159. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 368 (1931) (stating that due process liberty includes free speech); Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380, 386 (1927) (holding that language of manifesto protected under Gitlow test).
160. E.g., Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 7-10 (Tex. 1992); Casso, 776 S.W.2d at
556; O'Quinn v. State Bar of Texas, 763 S.W.2d 397, 402-03 (Tex. 1988); Express Printing Co.
v. Copeland, 64 Tex. 354, 359 (1885).
161. E.g., Reed v. State, 762 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, pet. ref'd);
Lindsay v. Papageorgiou, 751 S.W.2d 544, 549 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ
denied).
162. See, e.g., Exparte Meckel, 87 Tex. Crim. 120, 125-26, 220 S.W. 81, 84 (1920) (discussing state power in conjunction with bill of rights); Ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 337-38,
220 S.W. 75, 76 (1920) (acknowledging that federal and state constitutions protect "freedom of
speech" and "freedom of the press"); Exparte Neill, 32 Tex. Crim. 275, 275, 22 S.W. 923, 923
(Tex. Crim App. 1893) (applying § 8 of state bill of rights to nullify ordinance that declared
newspaper was nuisance).
163. Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 7-10 (containing history of Texas free speech doctrine and
discussing Texas constitutional protections).
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sions. "' In fact, a few appellate decisions have even suggested that
the affirmative structure of the "highly valued" Texas rights of
speech, expression, and petition might also prevent
private parties
165
from abridging these rights in some situations.
For modem-day provisions, it is appropriate to examine whatever
summary or description was placed on the ballot proposal that the
voters ratified as well as any official state-sponsored analysis of the
amendment and how it would function. 166 One should also consider
the reports or summaries of the Texas Legislative Council.
One of the more complete composite studies of the current constitution is George Braden's The Constitution of the State of Texas: An
Annotated and ComparativeAnalysis, 1 67 written as part of the unsuccessful attempt to pass a new constitution in 1974. However, Braden's examination of the bill of rights must be taken with a caveat
because his overall agenda was to restructure the Texas Bill of Rights
to appear more like its federal counterpart, although the amendment
permitting the 1974 convention prohibited amending the bill of
rights.

B.

168

HistoricalApproaches

To decipher intent, the history of the era in which the constitutional provision developed and the social and political problems those
Texans faced may be very important.' 69 The historical development
164. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Tex. 1987).
165. See Shaver, 630 S.W.2d at 928-29 (explaining Texas perspective on free expression);
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. McMaster, 598 S.W.2d 864, 867-68 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980) (en banc) (making defendant's hearing for writ of habeas corpus open to public); Neill,
32 Tex. Crim. at 275-76, 22 S.W. at 923-24 (finding ordinance that made newspaper public
nuisance in violation of bill of rights); Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 894
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (finding affirmative guarantees of free speech
under Texas Constitution support cause of action against some private parties).
166. Cf. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 n.Il (Cal. 1975) (using election brochure to
interpret legislative measures and constitutional amendments).
167. GEORGE BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1977).
168. TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 2(g).
169. See generally PHILIP C. BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 9-24 (1982) (discussing
historical argument concerning constitution); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 513, 513-14 (1974) (rejecting theory that framers considered prospective consequences of
their rules and thus changed from instrumentalism to formalistic approach).
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of Texas is significantly different from that of the eastern United
States. That diversity often reflects itself in constitutional exegesis.
First, Texans faced problems with the central government in Mexico when Texas formed that country's northern frontier. Mexico
City's lack of responsiveness and its arbitrary conduct pushed the
Texans toward regional autonomy 7 ° and Texas moved to become a
republic, and later a state. The reasons for these actions and the goals
of the respective founders of the republic must be considered to determine the intent behind constitutional safeguards. The new republic
also faced difficulties integrating the Mexicans who became Texans
when Texas gained its independence. Racial and ethnic polarization
was often exacerbated, but the people recognized the need to structure
a modus vivendi to establish stability.
The Civil War and the reaction of different areas of the state to
secession and slavery affected Texas decisively. In the areas of the
state that were predominantly Mexican-American, the residents were
unsympathetic to slavery and regarded it as immoral. Some areas,
like Austin, were influenced by Governor Houston and rejected separation from the Union. After the war came Reconstruction and the
controversial tenure of Governor Richard Davis. It would be a mistake to view the people's rejection of Davis simply as an anti-Reconstruction event, though this was certainly a strong factor. Rather, the
rejection of Davis reflected the reaction of the era to (1) rule by a
dominant central government that was often allied with large moneyed interests and (2) control by an executive with broad powers
of
17
appointment that were often used to override local autonomy. 1
One must also study the view of history, political philosophy, legal
thought and theories, and understanding of individual rights held by
those drafting and ratifying the constitution. 72 For example, the
structural divergence between the 1876 constitution and its predecessors is significant because of the substantially different political philosophies the document incorporates.

170. See J.E. Ericson, Origins of the Texas Bill of Rights, 62 Sw. HIST. Q. 457, 463 (1959)
(noting Mexican influence in Texas history).
171. See generally A.J. Thomas, Jr. & Ann Van Wynen Thomas, The Texas Constitution
of 1876, 35 TEX. L. REV. 907, 913 (1957) (stating one flagrant violation of ideal of local selfgovernment was governor's appointment power infiltrating governing bodies of towns and
cities).
172. See White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 586, 196 S.W. 508, 515 (1917) (requiring jury trial
for sanity hearing because such right existed at time of constitutional provision's adoption).
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The current constitution reflects a dramatic shift in political attitudes from an ever-expanding central government to a more populist
concept of limited government. This government allowed greater local autonomy and fostered individual rights and equality, but primarily for white males. 17 3 To achieve these egalitarian goals, a coalition
of delegates-primarily Grangers-allied with the Republican and
African-American delegates to enact constitutional guarantees protecting themselves against the designs of the "centrist Democrats."
This mutual accommodation reflected Benjamin Franklin's admonition to risk hanging together simply because of the certainty of hanging separately. The pre-populist climate which manifested itself in the
1876 constitution advanced individual economic 74rights and protections, and promoted restrictions on big business.1
Besides economic conditions, one must examine the social history
of the time when the constitutional provision was developed. Courts
should evaluate Texas societal diversity, culture, traditions, racial and
ethnic make-up, culture, and emphasis on individuality when the provision was written. 175 Texas has typically characterized itself in terms
of rugged individualism and egalitarian fairness. Although that fairness may not have extended to minorities and women, it is nevertheless the collectively-proclaimed model. An argument can be made
that Texas was fairer to minorities in the late 1800s than in the early
twentieth century, when the Ku Klux Klan took hold in the South
and disenfranchising mechanisms were instituted.1 76 Fairness, in
173. For a thorough analysis of historical and political forces driving the 1876 constitutional convention, see John Walker Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case
Study of Texas (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, copy on file with St. Mary's Law Journal) and Seth McKay's, Making the Texas Constitution of 1876. See also John Walker Mauer,
State Constitutions in a Time of Crisis: The Case of the Texas Constitution of 1876, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1615, 1626-27 (1990) (discussing restrictive constitution of 1876 which broke liberal tradition exemplified in previous constitutions); Mikal Watts & Brad Rockwell, The Original
Intent of the Education Article of the Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771, 789 (1990)
(stating that Grange delegates imposed strict constitutional constraints upon government
power).
174. Mikal Watts & Brad Rockwall, The Original Intent of the Education Article of the
Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771, 787 (1990).
175. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986) (stating, "The powers restricted
and the rights guaranteed in the present constitution reflect Texas values, customs, and traditions"); see Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the
Norms and Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 973-76 (1985) (explaining impact that state diversity-such as regional history, social experience, structures of government
and finance, demography, and geography-has upon creation of constitutional rules).
176. See Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group
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qualitative terms, did not approach equality, but it did reflect a better
approach than that of many states at the time.
T.R. Fehrenbach's Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans177 and Rupert Norval Richardson's Texas: The Lone Star
State,17 1 two of the most widely respected general histories of Texas,
provide valuable historical insight into the constitutional development
of Texas. The Southwestern HistoricalQuarterly and its predecessor,
Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association (1897-1912), are
excellent scholarly periodicals on Texas history. Arnoldo DeLeon's
They Called Them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes Toward Mexicans in
Texas, 1821-1900 179 furnishes a superb historical perspective from the
Mexican-American community and is an equally worthy bibliography.18 0 Alwyn Barr has written a thorough historical account of the
poor treatment of African-American Texans in the last quarter of the
1880's, Black Texans: A History of Negroes in Texas, 1528-1971. ls '
Regional history also carries weight. How did the history of the
surrounding states, territories, and countries affect Texas constitu-

Representation: A Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY
VOTE DILUTION 67-71 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (addressing how poll tax effectively
disenfranchised minorities and poor whites), cited with approval in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 49 (1986); see also CHANDLER DAVIDSON, RACE AND CLASS IN TEXAS POLITICS 249
(1990) (focusing on increasing representation of minorities since 1970); DARLENE CLARK
HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS 27-28

(1979) (discussing attempts to diminish African-Americans' right to vote); DELBERT A.
TAEBEL & LUTHER W. ODOM, THE IMPACT OF THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ON SUFFRAGE
14-15 (1973) (discussing various restraints obstructing minority suffrage).
177. Fehrenbach's book also contains a section indicating further historical sources,
"Bibliographical Notes and Suggestions for Further Reading." T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE
STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS 721-29 (1983). See generally JOE BERTRAM
FRANTZ, TEXAS: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY (1976) (discussing constitutional development).
178. RUPERT NORVAL RICHARDSON, TEXAS: THE LONE STAR STATE (1943).
179. ARNOLD DELEON, THEY CALLED THEM GREASERS:

ANGLO ATTITUDES To-

WARD MEXICANS IN TEXAS, 1821-1900 (1983).
180. See generally MARIAN BONER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL

HISTORY (2d ed. 1987) (providing historical perspective); ARNOLDO DELEON, THEY CALLED
THEM GREASERS:

ANGLO ATTITUDES TOWARD MEXICANS IN TEXAS, 1821-1900 (1983)

(providing perspective of Mexican-American community); DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND
MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS 1836-1986 (1987) (providing perspective of MexicanAmericans).
181. See generally ALWYN BARR, BLACK TEXANS: A HISTORY OF NEGROES IN TEXAS,
1528-1971 (1973) (providing perspective of African-Americans); MERLINE PITRE, THROUGH
MANY DANGERS, TOILS AND SNARES: THE BLACK LEADERSHIP IN TEXAS, 1868-1900
(1985) (providing African-American perspective).
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tional law? What influence did Oklahoma, the Native Americans,
Mexico, New Mexico, and Louisiana exert on the Lone Star state?
Several other factors can influence constitutional development.
Courts should consider the demography of the Texas people and the
geography of the state. Texas had a large Mexican population, with
old roots and customs, when it became a republic and then a state.
The state also attracted great numbers of other ethnic groups, such as
the Irish and Germans, who brought their own customs and beliefs.
Sometimes the geography of the state helps explain constitutional development,18 2 such as the establishment of a centralized police force in
West Texas to maintain security. Finally, peculiar local or state interests may influence the drafting of a constitutional provision and may
give it a meaning different from that suggested by a comparable federal provision.
Texans' lifestyle, public attitudes, and approaches to government,
which they reflected in their constitutions, were different from that of
the aristocratic Virginians and the New England merchants who
penned the United States Constitution. Certainly, then, the most important factor to consider when gleaning the intent of the drafters and
voters who created the Texas Constitution is the uniqueness of Texas.
VIII.
A.

POLICY RATIONALES

Current Values

At various times, state supreme courts tend to give a more expansive reading to their rights charter for policy reasons. These courts
8I 3
understand that rights guarantees should reflect current values.
For example, a state supreme court could interpret a bill of rights as
banning capital punishment except for the crime of murder, though
executions were common for a variety of crimes when the bill of
rights was drafted. Although the authors and ratifiers of a bill of
rights would have sanctioned more capital punishment, public policy
has changed and so have the courts' constitutional interpretations.
This current-values method of analysis may be admired for its flexibility but could be criticized for being open-ended.
182. See generally DONALD WILLIAM MEINIG, IMPERIAL TEXAS: AN INTERPRETIVE
ESSAY IN CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY (1969) (containing helpful bibliography).
183. See Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 585 (1986) (suggesting that state constitutional law analysis
involves examination of text, intent of framers, and current values).
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The Federalist "Laboratory"

Some courts approach their bill of rights under Justice Louis Brandeis's "state laboratory" concept: "It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risks to the rest of the country." '84 As it plays out
in day-to-day life, the laboratory model has much merit. Between the
founding of the United States and implementation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states were the primary guarantors of individual
rights. 8 5 Often, the United States Supreme Court would look to state
constitutional jurisprudence in applying the Federal Bill of Rights.' 86
An excellent example is the exclusionary rule, which many states had
adopted long before the mandate of Mapp v. Ohio.187 Indeed, Mapp
shows that the Justices examined the states' actual experiments with
the exclusionary rule in order to show its viability and acceptance. 88
The same is true of the right to appointed counsel in Gideon v. Wain8 9 Mapp and Gideon are not the only instances in which the
wright."
states provided guidance to the federal high court in construing the
United States Bill of Rights, nor will they be the last. 90

184. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (discussing that "state
courts have thus been considered 'laboratories' of constitutional law").
185. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 n.3 (Tex. 1986). For an excellent overview
of historical reasons, federalism concerns, and procedural considerations in construing state
constitutions, see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnationof State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 956
(1982) (finding that individual state constitutions offer citizens protection against local and
state governments). See also Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State
Court Comment on Federal ConstitutionalIssues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1028-29 (1985) (allowing that state courts can mold
decisions to anticipate evolution of federal constitutional rights).
186. Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 686.
187. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (requiring exclusion of coerced
confession).
188. Id. at 651-52.
189. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338, 345 (1963).
190. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (reversing state action preventing black jurors from serving in trial of black
defendant); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (finding state denial of permit to
distribute printed material violated United States Constitution); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. '697, 721 (1931) (reversing state action invading liberty of press and due process
under United States Constitution).
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Dual Protection

A third policy approach favored by some state courts is that individuals' liberties have greater protection when guaranteed by two separate sources. 19 ' This method has a subset: a state constitution is
designed to protect those interests not safeguarded by the federal government, such as equal rights. Thus, it becomes a function of the state
court to make corrections in favor of protecting freedoms when federal law is deficient.
D.

Caveat

Each of these policy processes has its disadvantages and benefits.
One must avoid the temptation to seize upon a particular method
only to reach a certain result. Each issue should be evaluated with
intellectual integrity and a principled commitment to discern what the
law is, or should be, on a particular subject. 192
IX.

FUNCTIONAL REASONS

Four other arguments counsel state court vigilance over individual
freedoms. Their genesis lies in the unique functional role which the
framers and voters historically assigned to state courts to interpret
and develop Texas law. The 1875 convention delegates clearly intended judges to have plenary power to protect the people's civil
rights. The delegates distrusted the legislative and executive branches
and deliberately diffused and narrowly circumscribed their powers in
the 1876 constitution.' 93 The delegates placed checks on judicial
power by requiring judges to be popularly elected 194 and requiring the
191. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (claiming that
United States Constitution coupled with state constitution provide citizens with "double security"). See generally Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutionsas Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 708 (1983) (discussing evolution of state constitutional
law in affording greater protections under Federal Bill of Rights).
192. See, e.g., Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 166-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (contrasting application of Fourth Amendment of United States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of Texas Constitution).
193. See John Walker Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case Study
of Texas 188-89, 204, 221-22, 246-48 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with St.
Mary's Law Journal)(analyzing historical and political forces behind 1876 constitution).
194. Id. at 192, 236, 246-48; cf Samuel D. Myres, Mysticism, Realism and the Texas
Constitution of 1876, 9 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 166, 182-83 (1928) (concluding that constitution of
1876 imposed serious limitations upon power of government which rendered it practically
government of negation).
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trial bench to be elected directly from single-member districts.' 9 5
There are several arguments in favor of the popular election of
judges. The election of judges creates an accountability that lends
their office to constitutional development. If a judge vigorously construes the state constitution, the voters can accept or reject that interpretation through the electoral process.19 6 The direct participation of
the electorate in selecting judges is vital to the development of Texas
constitutional law. Consequently, the election of judges is not a happenstance event.
The difference in institutional roles between the state and federal
judiciaries provides a second argument in favor of the popular election of judges. 197 Federal courts possess circumscribed jurisdiction
and the fact that they set nationally observed norms serves as a conservative influence. State courts, on the other hand, historically have
had jurisdiction over virtually all matters: landlord-tenant law, property rights, family law, contracts, water rights, criminal law, and so
on. Their day-to-day expertise supports the contention that state
judges should play a substantial role in protecting constitutional
rights, particularly "within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a
state's judiciary." '
A third structural argument for state court vigilance is that if a
judge hands down an undesirable ruling, the legislature can address
the ruling either by statute 99 or by initiating the constitutional
amendment process. The Texas experience has shown it much easier
to amend the state constitution than to amend the federal constitu-

195. See John Walker Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case Study
of Texas 188-89, 221-22, 246-48 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with St. Mary's
Law Journal) (analyzing historical and political forces that served as basis of 1876
constitution).
196. Cf Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that
failure to independently construe state constitutional provisions places decision in hands of
Supreme Court which is not responsible to electorate).
197. See Wallace P. Carson, Jr., "Last Things Last": A MethodologicalApproach to Legal
Argument in State Courts, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 641, 647 (1983) (providing argument in
favor of primacy of Oregon Constitution); Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Speech:
Presentinga State ConstitutionalArgument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L.
REV. 635, 636 (1987) (describing relationship between state and federal constitutions).
198. Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1985); see Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at
686 (discussing state's judiciary as traditional protector of individual's constitutional rights).
199. Compare TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 51.317, 51.318 (Vernon 1988) (reinstating
revised Omnibus Fee Bill) with LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986) (finding
original Omnibus Fee Bill unreasonably interfered with right of access to court).
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tion. This "legislative oversight" function favors activist courts because it presents the judiciary as a partner with the other branches of
Texas government in protecting individual rights. 2"
The constitutional amendment that allows a direct appeal to the
Texas Supreme Court on constitutional issues provides another structural rationale for state judicial oversight.2 0 This mechanism facilitates quick resolution of important questions and indicates that the
drafters and voters expect the courts to play a vigorous role in constitutional development.
X.

BRIEFING A STATE LAW QUESTION

What follows is a suggested approach to analyzing and briefing a
state constitutional law question.
A.

The Texas Approach

The initial step is to suggest to the court what approach it should
take with respect to state law, that is, the primacy, dual reliance, supplemental, or federalism model. Unless the current direction of the
Texas courts changes, it is probably more helpful to use the federalism
model. The attorney should analyze both state and federal law,
presenting the state law argument first and then federal precedent,
even if at the outset federal law seems favorable. This method helps
attune the court to the importance and usefulness of the state constitution and demands clearer analytical precision, especially in crafting
the applicable tests. It also lessens the inclination to abbreviate state
analysis by appending a few comments about state authorities at the
end of an exhaustive federal law discussion. Besides, given its increasing decisional flux, federal law may change during the course of litigation. Finally, utilizing independent state constitutional grounds
should discharge the United States Supreme Court from reviewing,
and possibly overturning, the decision.
This is not to suggest, however, that the attorney should avoid federal decisions altogether. Often, the federal opinions provide an ana200. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between
the Norms and Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (1985) (discussing that
state judiciaries have been more willing to exercise the legislative oversight function than federal courts).
201. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-b; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.001(c) (Vernon 1987);
TEX. R. APP. P. 140.
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lytical model that may be modified and transposed into state
constitutional arguments. Perhaps even more important are Federal
Supreme Court dissents that would have provided the relief now
sought under the state constitution. State courts often take their cue
from thoughtful and well-reasoned dissents. These dissents may be a
gold mine for an alert practitioner.
B. Methodology
Because Texas courts prefer to apply statutory authority or common law before construing the constitution, °2 one should consider, in
order, the applicability of:
1. state agency rules or regulations;
2. state statutes or code sections;
3. the common law; and
4. a state constitutional provision (always including a Section 29
argument).2 °3

C.

Stating the ConstitutionalArgument

If the constitutional question must be reached, then at its beginning
the brief should set out:
1. a succinct outline of the facts and legal issues;
2. a concise 4statement of the proposed constitutional rule, using state
2
vocabulary; 0
3. a brief summary of suggested tests relevant to the rule, also using
state vocabulary;
4. a synopsis of the rule's application to the case; and
5. a short discussion of why federal law may be unsatisfactory in the
case or why the court should not consider federal law.

202. See San Antonio Gen. Drivers, Local No. 657 v. Thornton, 156 Tex. 641, 647, 299
S.W.2d 911, 915 (1957) (refusing to construe constitutionality of senate bill because legislative
history made it unnecessary to do so).
203. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 51, 76 S.W.2d 1007, 1011 (1934).
204. The proposed rule and suggested tests should utilize their own vocabulary in order
to avoid confusion with federal law and to limit federal review. Compare United States v.
Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 53 (1969) (utilizing "due process") with In re Carpenter, 835
S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, n.w.h.) (using "due course of law"); and compare Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587, 597 (1987) (referring to "equal protection") with Weaver
v. State, 823 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ ref'd) (discussing "equal rights").

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss2/3

40

Harrington: Framing a Texas Bill of Rights Argument.

1993]
D.

FRAMING A TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS ARGUMENT

439

Exegesis

Not all the following steps may be applicable or helpful in a specific
problem area, but they should be considered.
1. Analyze Texas case law.
a. Consider especially those decisions which predate the applicability of the federal provision to the state and qualify dicta which are
both prevalent and expansive in earlier cases.
b. Apply accepted rules of construction.
(1) General rules
(2) Specific rules relating to the bill of rights
2. Formulate textual arguments.
a. Review unique provisions.
(1) For example, the open courts provision
(2) Always include a Section 29 argument
b. Analyze linguistic structure.
(1) For example, affirmatively phrased rather than negatively
phrased language
(2) For example, the use of "or" rather than "and"
c. Consider similarities or variations with federal text.
3. Consider structural arguments.
a. Point out the prominent placement of rights guarantees in the
Texas Constitution (Article I).
b. Note the limitations on government power, diffusion of power,
liberal rights guarantees, etc.
c. Contrast the structure of the state text with the structure of the
federal text.
4. Determine the intent of the framers and ratifiers.
a. Review historical origins.2 °5
(1) Constitutional convention records, journals, news accounts
(2) Legislative debates
(3) Information on ratification ballot
(4) Ratification debates
b. Describe
contemporaneous
legislative
and
executive
interpretation.
c. Note the readoption of same text in subsequent constitution.
(1) Intervening court interpretations presumed incorporated
(2) Intervening legislative interpretations
205. See generally

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:

A

DOCUMENTARY

(1971) (discussing history of Federal Bill of Rights); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, 9
& DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 219-351 (1979) (containing
various historical documents which provided foundation for Texas Constitution).
HISTORY
SOURCES
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d.

Outline the history of the era.
(1) Social, economic, and political history
(2) Political philosophy, legal thought and theories
(3) Regional history
(4) Demography of era
(5) Geography
e. Explain the function of the judiciary.
(1) Role of courts (for example, expansive jurisdiction)
(2) Areas particularly appropriate for state bench (such as common law)
(3) Procedural arguments (direct appeal to Texas Supreme Court
on constitutional issues)
(4) Potential of legislative correction
f. Note that textual similarity does not mean identical intent.
states.
5. Compare constitutional texts of other
20 6
a. Textual similarities and variations
b. Similar origins or source as Texas Constitution
c. Comparable purpose or intent of the constitution
6. Compare constitutional decisions of other states, especially those
decisions predating application of federal guarantees to the states.
7. Analyze the policy reasons.
a. Current values
b. Federalist "laboratory"
c. Dual protection
E. Argument
The brief should accomplish the following three tasks in its
argument.
1. State the proposed constitutional rule.
a. Avoid federal terminology
b. Because the courts have held that Section 29 is itself a rights
guarantee, one should always rely on that section in addition to other
provisions, as part of the rule or argument.
2. Summarize the tests suggested for applying the rule.
3. Apply the rule to facts and legal issues of case.

206. See generally CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL & STATE (F.
Grad. 2d ed. 1982); CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL & STATE - FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES & RIGHTS, A 50-STATE INDEX (1980).
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FRAMING A TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS ARGUMENT

441

"PlainStatement" Request

As part of the brief, it is important to remind the court to include
the necessary "plain statement" in the judgment to make clear that
the decision is based on independent and adequate state grounds. For
example:
We make it clear that, when this court cites opinions from federal
courts and from courts of other states in construing provisions of the
Texas Constitution, we look at those precedents merely for reference.
We do not consider our results bound by those decisions. Our decision
here is [alternatively] based on separate, adequate, and independent
20 7
grounds, namely, the [law and] Constitution of the State of Texas.
G.

Conclusion and Prayer

The brief ends with a very short summary of the argument and
description of the relief sought.
XI.

CONCLUSION

No historian or legal scholar would deny that courts have expanded
constitutional doctrine to problem areas never contemplated by our
forebears. Nor would many dispute that our forebears certainly envisioned that result and, for that reason, penned general statements of
principle rather than specifics. They intended to create a constitution
"to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs... to provide... for exigencies which,
if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best
'20 8
provided for as they occur.
The genius of constitutional government is to adapt a bill of rights
207. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983) (holding that lack of "plain
statement" signaled Michigan Supreme Court's failure to decide case on independent state
constitutional grounds); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (N.H. 1983) (noting that court must
consider state constitutional guarantees); State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Or. 1983)
(distinguishing between persuasive federal authority and interpretation of state law); State v.
von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1020 (R.I. 1984) (finding that state may not infringe on constitutional rights); Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (basing holding on
decisions of Texas Court of Criminal Appeals); see also Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d.
194, 197 (Tex. 1985) (finding that decision under state constitution rendered decision under
federal constitution unnecessary); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983) (stating
that additional protection afforded by state constitution made decision under federal constitution unnecessary)
208. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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to modem-day life so that its "purposes" and "policies '' 20 9 protect us
and future generations regardless of scientific advances or sophistication of government.210 Justice John Paul Stevens echoed those sentiments: "We... read the Constitution in the only way we can, as 20th
century Americans....

The ultimate question must be, what do the

words of the text mean in our time?" 2 1' The task of applying lofty
constitutional ideals is difficult. The burden falls on the bar's creativity and principled scholarship to assist the state courts with the tools
to develop Texas constitutional jurisprudence. It is hoped that this
article will be of some help in that endeavor.

209. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 450 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 454. The Byers Court stated, "As uncertain as [is] the constitutional mandate
derived from.., the Bill of Rights, it is the task of this Court to seek that line of accommodation which will render [it] relevant to contemporary conditions." Id.

211. Justice Answers Attack from Attorney General, AUSTIN

AMERICAN-STATESMAN,

Oct. 26, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
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